@article{22449,
  keywords = {civilian oversight, DCAF, defense reform, EUAM, intelligence reform, NATO, parliamentary oversight, SSU, State Security, state security reform, Verkhovna Rada, VR},
  author = {Philipp Fluri and Leonid Polyakov},
  title = {Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report},
  abstract = {<p>Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</p>},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Connections: The Quarterly Journal},
  volume = {20},
  chapter = {51},
  pages = {51-59},
  month = {Winter 2021},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.20.1.03},
  language = {eng},
}