01832nas a2200289   4500000000100000000000100001008004100002260001600043653002300059653000900082653001900091653000900110653002400119653000900143653002800152653000800180653001900188653002600207653001900233653000700252100001800259700002000277245009300297300001000390490000700400520113500407       2021                            d  cWinter 202110acivilian oversight10aDCAF10adefense reform10aEUAM10aintelligence reform10aNATO10aparliamentary oversight10aSSU10aState Security10astate security reform10aVerkhovna Rada10aVR1 aPhilipp Fluri1 aLeonid Polyakov00aIntelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report  a51-590 v203 a<p>Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</p>