Attacking a Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption Scheme without Leakage

Farzaneh Abed, Francesco Berti, Stefan Lucks

How to cite:

Farzaneh Abed, Francesco Berti, Stefan Lucks

"Attacking a Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption Scheme without Leakage"

Information & Security: An International Journal,

37,

(2017):

45-53.

https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.3704

3704_attacking_leakage_resilient_encryption.pdf

Authors:

Farzaneh Abed, Francesco Berti, Stefan Lucks

Source:

Information & Security: An International Journal,

Volume: 37,

p.45-53

(2017)

Keywords:

attack, authenticated encryption, block cypher, leakage-resilience

Abstract:

Leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) aims at privacy and authenticity against adversaries with an additional side channel. The first published “leakage resilient” AE scheme is the RCB block cipher mode. As it turns out, RCB is insecure, even if there is no side channel for the adversary. The current paper presents several attacks on RCB.